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Chapter 8
Worker Choices About Payouts
in Public Pensions
Robert L. Clark and Janet Raye Cowell
Public sector retirement plans need to be regularly evaluated and updated
to ensure that they meet the needs of current and future public sector
workers and retirees. This has not happened to the extent needed, in part
because public pensions have been controversial in many places and recent
debates on pension reform have focused on the retirement plans’ costs.
Even when a plan’s fundamentals are strong, trustees have had to play
defense concerning the generosity and cost of the plans rather than being
able to direct their attention to managerial improvements. Incremental
improvements in plan design nonetheless are vital to maintaining plans
that match the needs of today’s public sector employees.
This chapter investigates an important issue affecting almost all retirees in
public employee retirement plans, namely the choice of annuity payment
option. Most public sector plans are of the deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) variety,
where beneﬁts are a function of years of service, ﬁnal average salary, and age
at retirement. Nevertheless, most public retirement plans in the US offer
retirees a menu of options for how their beneﬁt can be paid. The annuity
option that retiring employees elect will have signiﬁcant long-term ﬁnancial
implications for retirees and their households.
In the private sector, concern has been expressed that pension partici-
pants often request lump-sum distributions instead of selecting annuities
provided by the plan (Mitchell et al. 1999; Brown 2001). When a lump-sum
distribution is taken, retirees must manage their resources and bear both
investment and longevity risk. This is less of an issue in the public sector, as
most individuals who retire from public employment select one of the
annuity options offered by the pension plan. They do so in part because
selecting a lump-sum distribution may make them ineligible to remain in
the employer’s retiree health insurance plan. Therefore annuity options
offered by public retirement plans serve many retirees well by providing
lifetime beneﬁts, thus eliminating the risk that people might outlive their
retirement savings. An emerging question is whether the annuity options
currently offered by public retirement plans will continue to be attractive as
the population continues to age, life expectancy increases, and retirement
patterns change. This chapter describes current annuity options offered by
large public pension systems and then explores several modiﬁed annuity
options to potentially address these emerging issues and improve public
sector workers’ utilization of retirement beneﬁts.
We begin with a review of the annuity options offered by 85 large, state-
managed retirement plans for public employees. The lifetime patterns of
payments of these annuity options differ considerably. Next, we report the
results of a survey sent to the state Treasurers (or comparable ofﬁcial)
requesting information on the proportion of retirees selecting each option
offered under the public plans in their states. We also examine how well the
available annuity options serve the needs of public employees. Finally, we
examine two new types of annuity payouts that could enhance the likelihood
that public retirees will be able to achieve a reliable standard of living
throughout their retirement.
Retirement Beneﬁt Options in Public
Retirement Plans
We explore the current options offered by public sector retirement plans,
focusing on 85 state-managed retirement plans included in the 2012 Com-
parative Study of Major Public Employee Retirement Systems prepared by
the Wisconsin Legislative Council (2013).1 We reviewed the websites of each
of these plans and created a list of the various annuity options offered in
each case. The plans included in this review cover general employees and
teachers; pensions offered to police, ﬁreﬁghters, and elected ofﬁcials
are excluded from our analysis (see Appendix Table 8A.1).2 Among the
85 plans, 13 cover only state employees, 27 cover only teachers, 8 cover
only local employees, 14 cover state and local employees, 3 cover state
employees and teachers, and 20 include state employees, local employees,
and teachers.
Figure 8.1 depicts the number of plans that offer each of the most
frequently available annuity options.3 Using assumptions concerning age-
speciﬁc life expectancies of the retirees and beneﬁciaries, as well as the plan’s
assumed discount rate or rate of return, each retirement system attempts to
calculate the beneﬁts under each of the payment options so that the
expected present value of each annuity option is the same. For example,
the monthly beneﬁt is higher if the retiree selects a single life annuity (often
referred to as the maximum allowance), and it is lower if a joint and survivor
beneﬁt is chosen.4 Public plans usually offer separating employees the
option to request a lump-sum distribution. Unlike lump-sum options in
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the private sector, this distribution option in most public plans is based on
employee contributions compounded over time using a speciﬁed interest
rate.5 Public sector employees who are eligible for an immediate beneﬁt
upon terminating employment rarely request a lump-sum distribution.
Each plan offers an annuity in which the retiree is paid a monthly beneﬁt
based on a formula speciﬁed in the plan. In Figure 8.1, this option is labeled
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Maximum
allowance
Joint and survivor Guaranteed
payment
Social Security
leveling
Partial lump sum
Figure 8.1. Annuity options in state-managed retirement plans: number of plans
with each option
Notes : Maximum allowance refers to the option that pays the highest monthly beneﬁt to a
retiring member of a plan. This beneﬁt is a lifetime beneﬁt paid to the retiree on a monthly
basis. At the death of the retiree, all monthly beneﬁts cease. This type of beneﬁt is often called
a single life annuity. In some plans, the remaining balance due to employee contributions
may be paid out in a lump sum to a designated beneﬁciary at the death of the retiree.
Joint and survivor refers to the option that pays a reduced beneﬁt over the life of a retiree in
return for allowing a designated beneﬁciary to receive a percentage of the beneﬁt after the
retiree’s death. Plans often have various options with the survivor beneﬁt being equal to 100%,
75%, 50%, or 25% of the beneﬁt payable during the life of the retiree. Modiﬁed joint and
survivor is an available provision for some of these plans where monthly payments increase to
the amount payable under the maximum allowance upon the death of the beneﬁciary. Guar-
anteed payment refers to the option that guarantees a certain number of payments to the
retiree. If the retiree’s death occurs before receiving all of the monthly payments, the remaining
payments are made to the beneﬁciary until all payments have been made. Social Security
leveling refers to the option that pays larger monthly payments until the retiree is eligible for
Social Security at age 62. When the retiree becomes eligible to claim an early Social Security
beneﬁt the monthly payments from the pension are reduced to a lower amount so the total
retirement income (pension + Social Security) remains the same. Finally, partial lump sum
refers to the option that pays a one-time lump-sum payment of a portion of the retiree’s
retirement beneﬁt, plus a reduced monthly beneﬁt payable for the retiree’s lifetime.
The number of state plans with each option is shown above each bar.
Source: Authors’ computations using data derived from state plan websites.
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the maximum allowance and is basically a single life annuity where all
payments cease with the death of the retiree.6 Each plan also offers some
type of joint and survivor annuity option (J&S). These annuities provide a
lower income stream than the maximum allowance during the retiree’s life
but then they continue to pay monthly beneﬁts for the remaining lifetime of
the beneﬁciary. Plans usually offer several versions of the J&S beneﬁts. The
options specify the beneﬁt of the survivor as a percentage of the beneﬁt paid
to the retiree prior to her death. Typically, the beneﬁt paid to the survivor
represents a speciﬁed percentage of the beneﬁt paid to the retiree during
her lifetime. Most retirement systems offer a range of J&S payout options
(see Appendix Table 8A.2). Among the plans in our sample, 77 plans allow
retirees to select a 100 percent beneﬁt for the beneﬁciary while 78 plans
have a 50 percent option. In addition, 33 plans have a 75 percent option and
7 plans have a 25 percent survivor option. Finally, 16 plans have additional
J&S options. For example, Virginia’s SRS allows retirees to choose any whole
percentage of the retiree beneﬁt to be paid to the survivor between 10 and
100 percent. The larger the beneﬁt paid to the survivor, the lower the initial
beneﬁt that is paid during the life of the retiree.
Slightly fewer than half of the plans have an annuity option that provides a
single life annuity with a guaranteed number of payments. If the retiree
were to die before all of the guaranteed payments are made, the remaining
payments will be made to the named beneﬁciary; however, after the speci-
ﬁed number of payments, the survivor receives no further beneﬁts from the
retirement system. Of course, this option provides lower monthly beneﬁts
than those of the maximum beneﬁt option.
Another option offered by 14 plans allows retirees to select a partial
lump-sum distribution. These retirees then receive an immediate payout
reﬂecting some portion of the present value of their beneﬁt, and by accept-
ing this distribution, retirees agree to permanently lower monthly beneﬁts
from the retirement system in the form of single life annuities. The lump-
sum payments are typically speciﬁed as a percentage of the annuity or a
number of months of beneﬁts. For example, Georgia ERS restricts the lump
sum to between 1 and 36 months of the normal beneﬁt, and Ohio PERS/
STRS, Mississippi PERS, Virginia SRS, and Texas ERS have similar options.
Kansas PERS Tier 2 allows the retiree to select a 10, 20, or 30 percent option
which provides a lump sum equal to the percentage of the present value of
the maximum allowance and requires a corresponding reduction in the size
of the monthly beneﬁt. Some states limit eligibility for this option to indi-
viduals retiring at or after their full retirement date.
Twenty plans have an annuity option called ‘Social Security Leveling’.7
This option requires retirees to report to the retirement system their
expected Social Security beneﬁt at a speciﬁed age. Most state plans with the
Social Security leveling options stipulate that age 62 be used to determine
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the Social Security beneﬁt. However, Idaho PERS and Illinois SRS specify
that the leveling age is the full retirement age for Social Security, and North
Dakota TRF allows either age 62 or the full retirement age to be used in the
calculation. Virginia SRS allows the worker to choose any age between 62
and the Social Security full retirement age in this option, while Alaska PERS
uses age 65 in its calculation; however, that option is only available to
individuals who entered the system prior to July 1, 1996. Workers selecting
the option receive a higher initial beneﬁt from their state pension, com-
pared to the maximum beneﬁt option, and the annual pension beneﬁt is
reduced when the individual reaches the speciﬁed leveling age, at which
time the retiree is expected to claim a Social Security beneﬁt. The idea is
that the retiree will receive the same total retirement beneﬁt (pension
plus Social Security) before and after the age given for claiming Social
Security beneﬁts.
This option may appeal to some retirees because many public sector
workers retire prior to age 62 and hence before becoming eligible for Social
Security. To these early retirees, the higher initial pension beneﬁt can seem
attractive. A concern with this option is that, by linking the reduction in the
pension beneﬁt to age 62, retirees are encouraged to claim Social Security
beneﬁts as soon as they become available at age 62. This may not be optimal
for all retirees (Goda et al. 2015). The pension beneﬁt in the leveling option
is also based on the single life of the retiree and provides no beneﬁciary
payments after the death of the retiree.
Choice of Annuity Options by Recent Retirees
Figure 8.1 shows that public pension plans offer retirees a menu of payment
options. The key question for our study is whether even better options could
be designed for workers in the twenty-ﬁrst century, in the context of an
aging population and increasing life expectancy. To understand the impli-
cations of current annuity options and their impact on well-being in retire-
ment, we reﬁne data on the proportion of retirees selecting each of these
annuity options. To obtain this information, we sent an email request to the
50 state Treasurers and comparable ofﬁcials requesting data on the propor-
tion of recent retirees who selected each of the options offered by the plans
in their state. The email provided a link to an online page where the plan
administrator could report the distribution of retirees across the options.8
Ten states covering 13 plans responded to our request for information on
the annuity options selected by their retirees. Table 8.1 presents the
responses from the survey of plan managers by showing the proportion of
recent retirees that selected each of the options provided by their retire-
ment plans. In general, the most popular annuity option in most of the plans
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is the maximum allowance. Over 60 percent of retirees in the Mississippi
PERS, South Carolina SCRS, and Washington PERS have elected this single
life annuity, while between 50 and 60 percent of retirees opted for this
annuity type in California TRS, North Carolina TSERS, and North Carolina
LGERS. With the exception of Delaware, which reported that 100 percent of
its retirees selected a J&S annuity, the lowest proportions of retirees select-
ing the maximum allowance were in Iowa and Nebraska. In those states,
almost one-third of retirees selected the guaranteed payment period and
about 20 percent chose the partial lump-sum option. Each of these options
requires the retiree to select the single life annuity and then adjusts the
monthly payment to offset the expected payments associated with the
option. Neither of these options provide a retiree’s surviving beneﬁciary a
beneﬁt for life.
All of these options provide a retirement beneﬁt to retirees for the duration
of their lives but, in general, they do not provide any beneﬁt to survivors. The
J&S options enable retirees to engage in long-term planning for a beneﬁciary,
typically a surviving spouse.9 With the exception of Delaware SEPP that
TABLE . Percentage of state retirees selecting annuity options
State Plan Maximum
allowance
Joint
and
survivor
Social
Security
leveling
Guaranteed
payment
Partial
lump
sum
California PERS 44.5 37.3 1.3 N/A N/A
California TRS 52.1 46.9 N/A N/A N/A
Delaware SEPP 100 N/A N/A N/A
Iowa PERS 9.4 38.2 0.4 32.8 19.2
Maryland SRPS 40.0 34.0 N/A N/A N/A
Mississippi PERS 65.8 22.0 N/A 7.6 21.1
Nebraska SPP 14.1 38.8 N/A 30.2 N/A
North
Carolina
TSERS 56.2 25.9 17.9 N/A N/A
North
Carolina
LGERS 55.7 34.6 9.7 N/A N/A
South
Carolina
SCRS 64.3 30.4 4.6 0.4 N/A
Washington PERS 65.2 34.8 N/A N/A N/A
Washington TRS 38.8 21.4 N/A N/A 39.8
Wyoming WRS 43.1 52.9 N/A 4.1 N/A
Notes: In some cases, plan managers reported retirees selecting annuity options that are not
shown on websites as being available to current retirees. This difference could be due to
annuity options that were offered to individuals hired at earlier dates. Plans often have
various tiers that cover individuals hired at various times. The request to the Treasurers was
to provide information on the proportion of retirees selecting each of the options. California
TRS participants are not included in Social Security.
Source: Data provided by state plans in response to Janet Cowell’s email to state Treasurers.
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reported 100 percent of its retirees selecting a J&S option, only in Wyoming
WRS andCalifornia TRS does the proportion of retirees selecting a J&S option
approach 50 percent. All of the other beneﬁt options are based on single life
annuities and provide little in the way of expected lifetime income protection
to surviving spouses. Since public retirement plans are not subject to ERISA,
there has been no requirement that the interest of a spouse be considered
when the retiree is selecting a distributional option.
Five of the 12 plans in which workers are also covered by Social Security
offer a Social Security leveling option. Among these plans, only in North
Carolina is the incidence of this option greater than 10 percent of retirees.10
The partial lump-sum option seems to be a desirable choice for some but by
no means all retirees. Only Iowa PERS, Mississippi PERS, and Washington
TRS offer retirees the option of partial lump-sum distributions where 20 to
40 percent of retirees in each of these plans select this option. Five states
offer a guaranteed payment period annuity option. This distribution option
is popular in Iowa and Nebraska, where almost one-third of retirees select
it; however, the proportion of retirees in Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Wyoming selecting this option is under 10 percent.
Do these options represent the best payout choices for public sector
retirees, given the early ages at which many retire and the rising number of
years that many will spend in retirement? Sincemany public retirees ﬁnd new
employment shortly after leaving their career jobs, their need for immediate
income from their pension may be less pressing compared to older persons
who do not work after retirement. Moreover, delaying the start of Social
Security beneﬁts is an excellent method of enhancing retirement income,
but the Social Security leveling option encourages people to take their bene-
ﬁts as soon as they are eligible. In what follows, we develop two annuity options
that could enhance the probability that public retirees will achieve their
retirement goals.
New Annuity Options for Public Retirement Plans
We now examine two potential new annuity options that could improve
retirement well-being for some households. One would be to allow retirees
to defer receiving their retirement beneﬁts to a speciﬁed age, with the
proviso that the retirement system would recalculate the monthly beneﬁt
so that the lifetime expected present value would be the same as if beneﬁts
had begun at the time of retirement. In the following, we refer to this option
as a ‘deferred annuity’. This could appeal to young retirees in good health
and who expect to shift from their career public job to new employment.11
The second option would be for public retirement systems to modify the
Social Security leveling options so workers could elect later target ages for
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claiming Social Security. We call this a ‘ﬂexible Social Security leveling’. This
second approach could appeal to young retirees who do not plan to re-enter
the labor force after retirement but who would like to maximize their
retirement income. Both options should provide increased income in the
later years of retirement compared to currently available options.
Deferred Annuity
Many career public employees retire from their state or local jobs at rela-
tively young ages, in their 50s or early 60s.12 Many of these young retirees
move directly, or after a short period, into bridge jobs or new careers.13
Clark et al. (2015) reported that 85 percent of public employees age 50–9
in North Carolina planned to work after retiring from their current state or
local government job. Younger retirees are much more likely to anticipate a
period of employment following retirement from their public sector jobs.
Depending on whether they work full- or part-time, these individuals may
not need to draw their pension immediately after leaving the public sector.
A deferred annuity option would offer public sector retirees the oppor-
tunity to select some future year to start retirement beneﬁts with the annual
beneﬁt being recalculated, so that the expected present value of lifetime
retirement beneﬁts remained the same regardless of when they were initi-
ated. Using the restriction that the new option would be cost-neutral to the
system, the increase in annual beneﬁts would be an easy calculation using
the same assumptions currently used by the system to determine other
beneﬁt calculations. This new annuity option should be cost-neutral to the
system in the same manner as joint and survivor annuities are cost-neutral
relative to the maximum beneﬁt options in public sector retirement plans.
A simple example helps illustrate the impact on annual retirement beneﬁts
of postponing the start of annual payouts based on a deferred annuity option.
Assume that a worker leaves public employment at age 55 with the option to
start receiving a beneﬁt of $30,000 immediately (themaximumallowance), or
a higher annual beneﬁt beginning at some point in the future. She can expect
to live until age 85, for 30 years of beneﬁts in retirement. Table 8.2 shows the
beneﬁt if the worker selected the deferred annuity option and delayed the
start of beneﬁts for ﬁve years until age 60, or 10 years until age 65.
If the retiree deferred the start of beneﬁts under the deferred annuity
option until age 60, she could anticipate a life annuity beginning at that time
of approximately $39,233 (using a real interest rate of 3 percent).14 If
beneﬁts were delayed further until age 65, the annual beneﬁt would
increase to $53,351. Of course, the retiree does not have access to any
beneﬁts during the ﬁrst ﬁve or ten years while the beneﬁt is being deferred.
For public employees who leave their career job in their 50s and shift to new
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employment, the deferred annuity could be an effective means of enhan-
cing retirement income. Table 8.2 shows that the increase in annual beneﬁts
will be greater when the system uses an interest rate consistent with its
assumed rate of return or discount rate used in calculating the present
value of liabilities.
The deferred annuity option would give retirees more ﬂexibility in their
retirement planning and allow some to shift income from a period of
continued employment in bridge jobs to later ages. Clark et al. (2015)
illustrate the importance of bridge jobs and work after retirement for public
retirees in North Carolina. This adjustment to the timing of retirement
income could also help retirees ﬁnance health care costs, which often rise
with advancing age, and provide increased protection against the erosive
effect of inﬂation over 20 or 30 years in retirement.
TABLE . Impact of deferred annuity on annual payouts and pension present
values (PV)
Annuity option Annual payout PV@55 PV@60 PV@65
Maximum allowance
3% interest $30,000 $588,013
7.25% interest $30,000 $363,110
Deferred annuity: ﬁrst beneﬁt deferred until age 60
3% interest
Ages 55–64 $0 $588,013 $683,174
Ages 65–84 $39,233
7.25% interest
Ages 55–64 $0 $363,110 $522,878
Ages 65–84 $45,884
Deferred annuity: ﬁrst beneﬁt deferred until age 65
3% interest
Ages 55–64 $0 $588,013 $793,735
Ages 65–84 $53,351
7.25% interest
Ages 55–64 $0 $363,110 $749,724
Ages 65–84 $72,150
Notes: Values in table assume that the individual retires at age 55 and dies at age 85. Selecting the
maximum beneﬁt allowance, the annual pension beneﬁt is $30,000 if the retiree begins
receiving payments at age 55. The present value of $30,000 per year for 30 years at a 3% discount
rate is $588,013 and $363,110 using a discount rate of 7.25%. Next, we assume that if beneﬁts
are deferred, the retirement system pays an implicit annual return on the present value
equal to the assumed interest rate. The annual payouts at age 60 and 65 are derived by using
the annuity formula and the implied present value of the account balance at these ages.
Calculations are based on annual pension beneﬁt paid at the end of each year. Values are
derived using a real interest rate of 3% per year and an interest rate in the range of that assumed
by many state retirement plans of 7.25% per year.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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Flexible Social Security Leveling
Another group of public sector employees retires at relatively young ages and
leaves the labor force permanently. Such individuals need to access their
pension beneﬁts immediately on retiring from their career jobs. The Social
Security leveling option currently included in 20 public pension plans allows
retirees to receive an annual beneﬁt larger than themaximumbeneﬁt option
prior to the speciﬁed age, typically age 62, but then the pension beneﬁt
declines when the individual is eligible to claim early Social Security beneﬁts.
The idea is to provide retirees with a constant total annual beneﬁt (pension
plus Social Security) from retirement until death. While retirees are not
required to claim Social Security at age 62, if they do not, their annual
incomes will fall. Thus there is a strong incentive for retirees who have chosen
the Social Security leveling option to claim beneﬁts at age 62.
It is worth noting, however, that Social Security currently speciﬁes age 66
as the age for full retirement beneﬁts and imposes penalties for claiming
beneﬁts between 62, the early retirement age, and 66. Similarly, the system
currently provides delayed retirement credits for postponing the start of
beneﬁts up to age 70.15 Claiming beneﬁts prior to age 66 results in a
reduction in monthly beneﬁts of ﬁve-ninths of 1 percent per month for
the ﬁrst 36 months and ﬁve-twelfths of 1 percent for each additional
month.16 Delaying claiming beneﬁts after age 66 increases beneﬁts by
8 percent per year up to age 70. Assume that if beneﬁts are begun at the
full retirement age of 66, the monthly beneﬁt will be $1,000. If beneﬁts are
claimed at 62, the earliest age of eligibility, the monthly beneﬁt is only $750
per month or a 25 percent reduction in monthly beneﬁts for the rest of
one’s life. Despite these penalties for early claiming, almost half of all
individuals claim beneﬁts at age 62.17 In contrast, if beneﬁt claiming is
delayed until age 70, the monthly beneﬁt would be $1,320 or 32 percent
greater than would be true if beneﬁts are begun at age 66. Comparing
the beneﬁt at age 70 to the beneﬁt at 62, the monthly beneﬁt is 76 percent
greater when beneﬁts are claimed at age 70.18
Experts examining the Social Security rules have also argued that, for
most households, delaying the start of Social Security beneﬁts results in a
higher lifetime present value of these beneﬁts (Shoven and Slavov 2014a,
2014b). Moreover, the rise in lifetime beneﬁts resulting from a claiming
delay has been increasing due to changes in Social Security rules.19 Shoven
and Slavov (2013: 1) state that ‘with today’s life expectancies and today’s
extremely low interest rates, it is in almost everyone’s interest to delay the
commencement of Social Security. For many people, delaying to 70 is the
value maximizing strategy.’20
Instead of claiming Social Security beneﬁts at age 62, Goda et al. (2015)
examine how retirees could draw on their assets in retirement saving
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accounts (IRAs and 401(k) accounts) to fund consumption for several years
prior to claiming Social Security beneﬁts. Because the lifetime expected
present value of Social Security beneﬁts is greater when individuals wait to
begin claiming their beneﬁt until an older age, drawing on personal savings,
such as the retirement savings accounts mentioned earlier, after age 62 and
waiting to claim Social Security beneﬁts at older ages will yield higher annual
retirement income.
A ﬂexible Social Security leveling annuity would allow public sector
retirees to select any age between 62 and 70 for the target date on which
the pension annuity would decline and Social Security beneﬁts would
begin.21 This option would use the same assumptions currently used to
derive the pension annuity before and after age 62, and thus should be
cost-neutral to the system. If the lifetime present value of Social Security
beneﬁts rises with delayed claiming while the present value of the pension
beneﬁts is held constant, then total annual income will be higher if Social
Security leveling were based on a later retirement age.
Conclusions
State and local retirement plans typically offer retirees a range of annuity
options. Nevertheless, increasing life expectancy and delayed retirement
suggest some new options are needed. Speciﬁcally, the deferred annuity
option we outline here would allow young retirees who are moving to new
jobs the ability to defer the start of their pension, providing for a greater
beneﬁt in future years. A ﬂexible Social Security leveling option would pro-
vide greater annual beneﬁts for early retirees throughout their retirement.
This second innovation would take advantage of the fact that the present value
of Social Security beneﬁts increases if claiming is delayed for most individuals.
In the wake of the economic downturn, many public pension plan admin-
istrators and lawmakers came to the conclusion that modifying or even
terminating existing public sector DB plans would provide cheaper, more
sustainable retirement beneﬁts. Pension reforms have ranged from simple
reductions in beneﬁt generosity, including beneﬁt multiplier reductions
or increased normal retirement ages, to a more drastic restructuring of
beneﬁt design. Such changes have typically aimed to shift some or all of
the investment and longevity risk on to employees while protecting the
employers against risk, market volatility, and further increases in pension
costs. But the efﬁcacy of these pension reforms in minimizing employer
costs and risks, as well as the broader impact on public sector retirement
security and human resource needs, remain to be seen.
Meanwhile, we have outlined two ways to restructure the traditional
DB plans to ensure that these plans can meet the needs of current and
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future public sector workers and retirees. Ultimately, the true value of a
public employee beneﬁts system is that retirement beneﬁts help govern-
ment employers recruit and retain qualiﬁed personnel to deliver essential
services and then provide adequate retirement income to career employees.
This policy goal reﬂects a trade-off between the cost of funding the plan and
the beneﬁt of maintaining a quality labor force that is able to produce the
goods and services that its citizens desire. To this end, it is essential to
administer the plan beneﬁts in a manner that encourages sensible public
employee choices in the face of evolving economic circumstances and
preferences. Modernization of this beneﬁt structure will build the con-
tinued value, equity, and cost effectiveness of these plans. Reforming trad-
itional DB plans instead of shifting to deﬁned contribution plans or hybrid
plans is a viable path forward for some state and local governments.
Our study highlights one important plan characteristic within the larger
design of DB plans that demonstrates the valuable role that independent
policy and economic research can play in pension reforms. Reinventing
pension administration requires that adequate time and resources be devoted
to understand the costs, beneﬁts, efﬁciencies, and opportunities with the
current system.Changingpublic sector retirement plans without such analysis
could yield undesirable outcomes and produce unanticipated, and even
potentially harmful, fallout for public employers, employees, and taxpayers.
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Notes
1. The Wisconsin report compares important characteristics of retirement plans
covering major state and local retirement systems in the US. Similar reports have
been prepared bi-annually since 1982 and are a useful source of pension char-
acteristics and how they have evolved over the past 30 years. Key characteristics of
plans include normal and early retirement provisions, contribution rates, vesting
requirements, beneﬁt formulas, COLAs, and actuarial methods and assump-
tions. Many public plans have speciﬁc features that vary by when employees
were hired. For these plans, the report describes the features that apply to the
most recently hired employees.
2. While these plans for speciﬁc types of employees are not included in theWisconsin
survey, we did receive information from some of the states indicating the propor-
tion of retirees in these plans that selected speciﬁc types of annuities.
3. The options available to current retirees in each of the plans are reported in
Appendix Table 8A.2.
4. The beneﬁt paid to the retiree who selects a J&S option will depend on the age of
the beneﬁciary and beneﬁt paid to the survivor relative to the beneﬁt payable
while the retiree was alive.
5. In the private sector, most DB plans do not require employee contributions. The
lump-sum distribution is based on a calculation of the discounted present value
of the promised annuity.
6. The maximum beneﬁt allowance in some plans includes a provision to provide a
payment to the survivor if the total pension payout has not exceeded the worker’s
contributions to the plan.
7. Workers in 17 of the 85 plans are not covered by Social Security. Ten of these
plans in which participants are not included in Social Security cover only
teachers.
8. The email requested information on the proportion of retirees selecting each of
the annuity options. In some cases, certain options may no longer be offered so
we observe some differences in the annuity options that are shown in Appendix
Table 8A.2 and the responses to the survey presented in Table 8.1.
9. Brown and Poterba (2000) examine the importance of joint life annuities and
the demand for this type of annuity by married couples.
10. It is important to remember that only individuals who retire prior to the speci-
ﬁed age in the leveling options would be able to select Social Security leveling.
Thus, the proportion of eligible retirees selecting Social Security leveling will be
higher than the proportion of all retirees choosing this annuity.
11. Cahill et al. (2012, 2015) use the Health and Retirement Survey to document this
type of return to work after retirement from a career job.
12. The retirement plans included in this study typically have several age and
service requirements that allow career employees to retire in their 50s with
unreduced beneﬁts. In 2012, 40 plans had normal retirement requirements
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that allowed workers with 30 or fewer years of service to retire at age 55 with
unreduced beneﬁts. Another 11 plans determine eligibility by the sum of an
individual’s age and service (‘Rule of 85’ or ‘Rule of 80’) which allows career
employees who began their employment in their 20s to receive unreduced
beneﬁts in their 50s. Public retirement plans are now moving to increase
normal retirement ages. According to the Wisconsin Comparative Study of
major plans, between 2010 and 2012, 29 plans increased the requirements for
normal retirement.
13. Clark and Morrill (2016) provide a comprehensive review of retirement
transitions including workers remaining on career jobs until complete retire-
ment, shifts into phased retirement, and movement into bridge jobs or self-
employment.
14. This calculation is based on the present value of $30,000 per year for 30 years
which is $588,013. If the retirement system credits this balance with a 3 percent
per year return for 10 years, the account balance would be $793,734 at age 65.
Again using a discount rate of 3 percent, the annual payout for an expected 20
years would be $53,351. Thus, the increase in the annual retirement beneﬁt is
due to the increase in the account balance from delaying the start of the annuity
and the shorter payout period associated with a higher age for starting
the annuity. A 3 percent discount rate is consistent with the rate that most
economists would recommend as an approximation of the real interest rate.
Most public pension plans use a much higher rate, typically between 7 and 8
percent. Thus, we also provide the impact of using a higher interest rate consist-
ent with the assumption adopted by most plans.
15. Under current law, the full retirement age is scheduled to rise to 67 for individ-
uals born in 1960 or thereafter.
16. Knoll and Olsen (2014) describe how these reductions for claiming early and
increases for delaying claiming after the full retirement age have changed over
time to provide increased incentives for delaying the start of beneﬁts. Based on
their analysis and review of the literature, they conclude that delaying the
claiming of Social Security retirement beneﬁts is now recognized as an important
way to enhance retirement security.
17. Munnell and Chen (2015) ﬁnd, using a cohort analysis, that the proportion of
recent cohorts claiming beneﬁts at age 62 has fallen to 36 percent for men and
40 percent for women.
18. The impact of claiming age onmonthly beneﬁts is nicely shown in ‘When to Start
Receiving Retirement Beneﬁts’, https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10147.pdf
19. For instance, the increase in the delayed retirement credit after the full retire-
ment age, lower real interest rates, and increases in life expectancy for individ-
uals in their 60s.
20. Shoven and Slavov (2013) provide a detailed review of claiming options and how
delaying the start of Social Security beneﬁts increases lifetime beneﬁts.
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21. This option is similar to the one used by Virginia SRS except we would allow the
individual to specify any age between 62 and 70 for the calculation of retirement
beneﬁt.
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